

研究报告

2018

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Research Report

2018-9- edition

TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH September. th, 2018

An Analysis of the Infection and Intervention for Five Classical Financial Crisis

Center for Finance and Development

TANG Jinrong MA Jun

Abstract

This paper selects five financial crisis cases, which are the Japanese Asset Bubble Crisis in the 1990s, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, the US Subprime Mortgage Crisis in 2008, the European Debt crisis in 2009-2012 and the Chinese Stock Market Crash in 2015. Respectively, we summarized the causes, evolution, risk-interaction mechanism of these crisis, as well as lessons of their intervention policies. The analysis of cases illustrates that there are at least seven common factors in major financial crisis. They are: (1) High leverage is the common factor. (2) It is difficult to estimate whether the risk will evolve into a systematic risk. (3) There are large-scale problem assets that are not identified and difficult to be valued separately. (4) Fire sale is the main source of crisis contagion. (5) In some cases, the transition from the private sector crisis to the sovereign debt crisis is very fast. (6) At the beginning of the major crisis, the authorities often have obvious errors in pre-judgment. (7) After the crisis broke out, market reports or credit rating from third-party institutions with huge market influence may become an important factor in worsening the crisis. Meanwhile, we also concluded the following six lessons involved in policy intervention in the five major financial crises: (1) It needs a clear understanding of each aspect and consequences of the crisis. And all parties involved need to have a consensus on the cost sharing to invention, which is a prerequisite for effective crisis intervention policy. (2) It needs to set up crisis response and intervention programs and legal authorisation procedures in advanced. Otherwise, it will easily lead to the inability to effectively

400

1930

1980

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1. 1

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1985 9

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1 120²

GDP 1985 14. 23% 1987 9. 2%²

1987 2 G7

1989 5

² -

[M]

2009 pp.49

³ Wind

1987- 1990

1986 4

endaka f ukyo 1987 5

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⁴ Wind 1986-1988 CPI 1.5%

⁵ Okina, K., Shirakawa, M. and Shiratsuka, S., The Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy: Japan ' s Experience in the Late 1980s and the Lessons[J], Monetary and Economic Studies(Special Edition), 2001:pp.433-434

			1989		1990				
1989	5		1989	10				1989	
11			1990	3			1990	8	
			1990	3					
		1990	3						
	⁶	1992							
									⁷
1. 2									
	1- 1								
		⁸			1985	9	- 1987	5	
		1985	9						
					1985	10			

⁶
1600-2000
2015
2
pp.281-282.

⁷ 1991

⁸ Okina, K., Shirakawa, M. and Shiratsuka, S., The Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy: Japan ' s Experience in the Late 1980s and the Lessons[J], Monetary and Economic Studies(Special Edition), 2001:pp.397-399




¹⁰ Okina, K., Shirakawa, M. and Shiratsuka, S., The Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy: Japan's Experience in the Late 1980s and the Lessons[J], Monetary and Economic Studies(Special Edition), 2001:395-450

		1990	10	- 1992	12
225		15790			38130
			1992		
1990	25% ¹¹	1993			
1- 2					
1985	9				
			1986	1	1987 2
		1987	2		
		1989	5		
		1987	5		

11

[M]


2008 11



1-2

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¹³ [J] 2009 3 29

¹⁴ [M] 2008

1. 3

1991

1991 7

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

1990

1992 3

1- 1

1-1 1990-2000

				GP %
1990				7. 7
1991				6. 3
1992	3		8. 6	2. 6
	8 10. 7			
1993	4 13. 2		10. 6	0. 7
	9 6		1	
1994	2 15. 3		7. 2	2. 5
1995	4 4. 6		3. 9	2. 2
	9 14. 2		12. 8	
1996	6 3% 5%			2. 6
1997	11			1. 6
1998	4 16		8. 1	- 1. 2
	11 24			
1999	11 18		6. 8	- 1. 6
2000				



Wnd

1-3 GDP

1.4


1990

1990-2000

7

2008¹⁶

GDP



1990

1990



1998

2. 1

19

20

¹⁸ <https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-savings.htm>

¹⁹

²⁰

21


8%

2015 4

2.2

2-1 2-2

1997 7 2




Li ndgr en et al . 1999 2009

2-1



2-2

2-3



2-3

2.3

2-4 2-5

1997 7


1997 11

1997 12 1997 11 19

1998 2


1998 5

1998 8



EPS

2-4



EPS

2-5

IMF

22

2-1

IMF

3

IMF

1000

73

2009

2-1

	IMF	
	1997 10	497 IMF150
	1997 7 28	172 IMF40
	1997 7 11	IMF14.7
	1997 11 21	584 IMF211

IMF Staff Paper 2000 IMF 1998 1999

IMF

2-2

IMF

IMF

2-2 IMF

	30

Li ndgren et al . 1999

IMF

1998 3

0-2.5%

1998 3 IMF

4

IMF

1998

9 2

3.8 1

2.4

1999

11.31%

3-3

12

IMF

2008

3.1

2008

The Great Moderation

3.2

1

2007 2

106


2007 8 9

2009 5

7

- - - -

- 2008




Wnd

3-1

500

3-2



Wnd

3-2


2004 6

CDO

AIG

	2007	8	9				2008	3
16			AIG	2008	9	4	9	16
			9	14			9	15
9	21							

5 7



3-3

3-3

CDO

SIV

AIG

SIV

3-3

1

CDO

SIV Structural Investment Vehicle

SIV

SIV

2

AIG

SIV

AIG

SIV

SIV

SIV

3

-

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SIV

SIV

SIV

CDO

CDO

Asset-Backed

Commercial Paper ABCP SIV

CDO

SIVs

ABSCP

3.3

2008 3 16

2008 9 7

2008 9 15 AIG

2008 9 16

2008 9 20 -10 3

	10	13		11	19
2009	1	16		5	7

AIG

2007 8-

10

AIG

2008 9

9

2009- 2012

4. 1

	GDP	2008	3%	2009	6.9%
2010	27	20		GDP	
	3%		GDP		60%

2008 65% 2009 74.7%

4.2

1

4-1

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200910

20129

OMTOutright

Monetary Transactions

3

2011

12

EFSF

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IMF

7500

EFSF European Financial Stability

Fund 2012 2

European Stability Mechanism ESM

Securities Markets Programme ,


Long Term Refinance Operation LTRO

523 800 4891.9 5295

3 Outright Monetary

Transactions OMT EFSF

OMT



Wnd

4-4

4. 4

IMF

EFSF/ESM

OMT

2011 11 -2012 2

EFSF

LTRO

EFSF

LTRO

EFSF

IMF

IMF

EFSF/ESM

OMT

EFSF/ESM

2015

5.1

2015 A

+

4.7

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1 2015 A


2015

2015

1

6 15 -7 5 2

7 6 5-1



5-1 A

1 2015 6 15 -2015 7 5

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
500

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
500

2015



资料来源: Wind 资讯

5-3



Wind

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500

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15

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6

26

6

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7.40%

2049

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
3686.92

5.77%

4000

627

ETF



Wnd

16

IPO

7 27


8.48%

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2015 A

IPO

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5-6 2015 A


3

2015

IPO

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5-7 2015

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2015 A

6 26

7.40%


6 27

7 2 4000 8 3500

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IPO



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IPO

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6.1

1998

2009-2012

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24

3000

25

26

A

27

AIG

6.2

²⁴ Sharma, D S. The Asian Financial Crisis: Crisis, Reform and Recovery[M], New York: Manchester University Press: 7.

²⁵ . 2010 pp.60.

²⁶ 2013 pp.173

²⁷ 2015 6 26

http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhxwfb/xwfbh/201506/t20150626_279827.html

2008

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OMT

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