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
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ROA_{Adj}

ROA_{Adj}

μ_i

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After

After

profit_{it} / $\beta_1 After_{it} + \beta_2 Treat_{it} + \beta_3 After_{it} + \beta_4 Control_{it} + \gamma_t + \delta_i + \mu_{it}$ (2)

3.

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2SIS

$$y_{i,t} = \varphi + \gamma$$

$$ROA_{i,t+1} = \alpha + \beta$$

i, t

t

i, t

i, t

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$$\ln(1 +$$

			T-diff	T-diff
4.166	-2.166	16	-0.104	
(6.166)		(1)		
0	1.430	9	1.430	
(0.166)		(1)		
0	3.166		-0.962	
(0.166)				
0	0		1.338	
(0.166)				
			-0.969	
			1.532	
ROIC		0.055		
		0.306		
		(0.198)		
		0.592	0.612	
		(0.831)	(0.657)	
	-3.101***	38.361	37.691	
	(3.865)	(16.631)	(14.59)	
	0.179	0.168		
	(0.400)	(0.355)		
	3.008	2.080	3.008	
	(8.442)	(1.304)	(7.2)	
	137	10,175	137	63

Treat*After

After

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	1	2	4
ROIC	ROIC	ROIC	ROIC
2.705***	2.705***	2.705***	2.705***
(1.147)	(1.147)	(1.147)	(1.147)
0.824	0.824	1.187*	1.522
(0.774)	(0.774)	(0.635)	(1.410)
0.168	0.216	0.162	0.734
(0.195)	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.427)
0.123	1.358***	1.008	1.321***
(0.286)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.368)

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5.739 4.370 1.405

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Mixed-ownership Reform and Performance Improvement of State-owned Enterprises--Re-estimation Based on Propensity Score Correction and DID Methods

Zhou Jun-ping, Wang Hao

Abstract This paper mainly selects the ownership structure of A-share listed enterprises as the definition of mixed ownership, and constructs a research sample that includes the ownership reform enterprises. Based on this, this paper adopts the propensity score matching method to eliminate the endogenous problem, and tests the impact of mixed ownership structure on the profitability of enterprises. In order to alleviate the estimation bias caused by the endogenous problem. Studies have shown that compared with enterprises with purely state-owned equity structures, state-owned enterprises with mixed-ownership structure have higher performance levels. After the mixed ownership reform, the profitability of state-owned enterprises with equity structure can be significantly improved. The research on the mechanism shows that the enhancement of corporate incentives under mixed ownership is an important reason for the improvement of profitability.

Key Words Mixed-ownership reform; State-owned Enterprises Reform