



## Mutual fund managers' timing abilities

Li Liao<sup>a,2</sup>, Xueyong Zhang<sup>b,\*1</sup>, Yeqing Zhang<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> PBC School of Finance, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

<sup>b</sup> School of Finance, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China

<sup>c</sup> School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

### ARTICLE INFO

*JEL classifications:*

G10

G11

G19

G29

*Keywords:*

Market timing

Liquidity timing

Volatility timing

### ABSTRACT

This paper examines Chinese mutual fund managers' abilities to time market, market volatility, and market-wide liquidity. Using a sample of Chinese mutual funds, we employ both cross-sectional and bootstrap analyses and find strong evidence that, during 2001–2011, Chinese mutual fund managers demonstrated the ability to time market returns, volatility, and market liquidity. We also find top timers outperform bottom timers by 6–7% annually in out-of-sample tests, manifesting the practical meaning of timing ability. We then conduct robustness checks of our findings and the results are the same.

### 1. Introduction

There has been a lasting debate regarding whether mutual fund managers can successfully time several market condition dimensions. One strand of the literature focuses on managers' ability to time market returns but does not reach a consistent conclusion. For example, [Treyner and Mazuy \(1966\)](#) construct a model to test if managers can outguess the market but find no evidence to support their assumption.

2010). Therefore, we apply the bootstrap method to study whether Chinese stock mutual funds have true timing skills rather than good luck. [Kacperczyk et al. \(2014\)](#) suggest that some of mutual fund managers have time-varying skills and they are able to successfully time the market only in recessions. We thus remove the sample in the crisis period from the main sample hereafter to conduct the robustness check in this paper. [Ferson and Mo \(2016\)](#) document that funds with superior ability are more likely to engage in adverse volatility timing behavior; that is, managers tend to increase market exposure when the volatility is high due to their option-like compensation. Yet very little research has been carried out to investigate whether Chinese mutual fund managers can time

**Table 1**

Summary statistics.

This table presents data summary statistics. The returns of mutual funds (in percent per month) summarize the monthly returns on equity-oriented and mixed mutual funds and N is the number of funds that exist any time during the sample period. The other variables summarized in the table include stock market index excess returns (MKT), the market volatility measure (volatility), the Pástor–Stambaugh market liquidity measure (Pástor–Stambaugh liquidity), a size factor (SMB), a book-to-market value factor (HML), and a momentum factor (Momentum). Pástor–Stambaugh liquidity is the average liquidity cost (price impact) in percent for a 7 million yuan trade in 1996. The sample period is from 2001 to 2011.

	N	Mean	Median	STD	25%	75%
Return of mutual funds	280	1.064	1.104	0.860	0.651	1.433
MKT	132	0.498	0.639	9.004	− 5.509	5.093
Volatility	132	1.606	1.362	0.745	1.100	1.896
Pástor–Stambaugh liquidity	132	− 3.542	− 2.670	3.879	− 5.434	− 1.476
SMB	132	0.598	0.418	4.306	− 1.965	3.253
HML	132	0.154	0.340	3.850	− 1.499	2.410
Momentum	132	− 0.870	− 0.576	4.615	− 3.646	2.102

we estimate regression models to assess how a fund's beta in month  $t - 1$  changes with market conditions realized in month  $t$ , while exposure to other factors of the fund is controlled for. Our results document significant and positive timing abilities at the individual fund level by demonstrating that fund managers adjust market exposure based on their latest observations, including market returns, volatility, and liquidity. Thus, these findings indicate that the timing ability of Chinese mutual fund managers is not the same as that of mutual fund managers in developed economies.

We use the bootstrap method of Kosowski et al. (2006) and Jiang et al. (2007) to also test whether the significance of the timing ability is driven by luck. Specifically, we construct hypothetical funds that share similar risk exposure as actual funds but do not have timing ability and then compare the actual timing coefficient estimates with the corresponding distribution of estimates from the pseudo-funds. We further calculate out-of-sample alphas to verify that the timing skill of mutual funds can provide economic value for investors. We find top timers outperform bottom timers by 6–7% annually in out-of-sample tests. In addition, we conduct robustness tests to eliminate the impact of potential biases on our primary results about timing ability. For example, we solve the time-series correlation of timing measures, control for the influence of bond returns, exclude the financial crisis period, and examine the correlations between the three types of timing skills. Finally, we investigate the relation between investment styles and timing abilities and find that there are no significant differences in timing ability across the three investment-style categories of funds.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the mutual fund data and methodology that we use to evaluate timing ability. Section 3 presents the cross-sectional and bootstrap analyses of mutual fund timing abilities and the economic value of timing skills by examining out-of-sample alphas for portfolios of funds at different levels of timing skills. Section 4 contains further analysis and discussions. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.

## 2. Data and methodology

### 2.1. Chinese mutual funds

Our mutual fund data are from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, which belongs to GTA Education Tech Ltd., a leading Chinese financial data provider. We include only equity-oriented and mixed funds (excluding index funds) that invest only in the Chinese market and have existed for > 36 months between 2001 and 2011. Our sample thus includes 280 mutual funds.

Table 1 reports the summary statistics of our Chinese mutual fund sample. Over the sample period, the average monthly excess return of Chinese mutual funds is 1.06% (about 12.77% per year), with a standard deviation of 0.86%. The Chinese stock market averaged a monthly excess return (MKT) of 0.50%, with a standard deviation of 9.00%, from 2001 to 2011. Volatility, which is 1.61% per month, on average, is the market-wide volatility. Table 1 also shows the summary statistics of monthly Pástor–Stambaugh liquidity measures, which is − 3.54%, on average. Following Chen et al. (2017), the monthly data on these four risk factors that we use in this paper comes from China Asset Management Academy (CAMA),<sup>5</sup> which provides a detailed construction method and reliable calculation of the Carhart factors (SMB, HML, and MOM). These key variables are defined in the following.

Fig. 1 plots the time series of monthly Chinese market volatility from January 2001 to December 2011. The highest market volatility occurred throughout all of 2008 and the lowest occurred between 2003 and 2006. Fig. 2 plots the time series of monthly Pástor–Stambaugh market liquidity over the sample period. Pástor–Stambaugh market liquidity peaked at 0.16 in September 2008 and dropped to − 0.19 in October 2011. These extreme points are consistent with the date of the financial crisis; the volatility and liquidity of the Chinese A-share stock market that we use are therefore appropriate.

<sup>5</sup> <http://sf.cufe.edu.cn/kxyj/kyjg/zgzcglyjzx/index.htm>.

## *2.2. Methodology*

In this section, we describe the timing models in the following empirical work. We investigate the timing abilities of Chinese fund managers based on [Carhart's \(1997\)](#)

$$\beta_{p,t-1} = \beta_{p,1} + \gamma_p E(\text{market condition}_t | I_{t-1}), \quad (2)$$

where  $I_{t-1}$  is the available information for fund managers in month  $t-1$ ,  $\beta_{p,1}$  measures fund  $p$ 's average market beta, and  $\gamma_p$  reflects managers' timing skill, representing how the market beta of fund  $p$  changes with forecasts of market conditions. Eq. (2) presents different expressions for different dimensions of market conditions. As an example, when we focus on market returns,  $\beta_{p,t-1} = \beta_{p,1} + \gamma_p (MKT_t + v_t)$ , where  $v_t$  is a forecast noise unknown until  $t$ . A positive  $\gamma_p$  means that fund  $p$  has a high (low) market beta under good (poor) market conditions. By inserting different timing models of Eq. (2) into Eq. (1), we construct the timing models (Eqs. 3 to 6) to examine the three timing skills based on managers' forecasts of market returns, market volatility, and market liquidity, respectively.

### 2.2.1. Market-timing models

We use the [Treyner–Mazuy \(1966\)](#) market-timing model and the [Henriksson–Merton \(1981\)](#) timing model to test whether Chinese mutual fund managers have market-timing ability, as follows, respectively:

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_p MKT_t^2 + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \varepsilon_{p,t}, \quad (3)$$

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_p \text{Max}(MKT_t, 0) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \varepsilon_{p,t}, \quad (4)$$

where  $MKT_t^2$  is the square of the monthly market excess return in month  $t$  and  $\text{Max}(MKT_t, 0)$  equals the monthly market excess return in month  $t$  when it is positive and zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient  $\gamma_p$  reflects market-timing skill. A positive  $\gamma_p$  implies the existence of market-timing skill due to the successful adjustment of portfolio exposures prior to market advances or declines.

### 2.2.2. Volatility-timing model

We employ the following regression to test volatility-timing skill:

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_p MKT_t((V_{m,t} - \overline{V_m})) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \varepsilon_{p,t}, \quad (5)$$

where  $\gamma_p$  represents volatility-timing ability and  $V_{m,t}$  is the market volatility-timing measure in month  $t$ . For each day  $n$ , we calculate the outstanding value-weighted daily return of all A-share Chinese stocks using the firms' market value on trading day  $n-1$  as weights in excess of the risk-free rate and we then calculate the monthly standard deviation of the daily market return to obtain  $V_{m,t}$ , where  $\overline{V_m}$  is the average market volatility across all months in the sample. We subtract  $\overline{V_m}$  from  $V_{m,t}$  to remove the inference of forecast noise.

### 2.2.3. Liquidity-timing model

We use a methodology similar to that above and define the coefficient  $\gamma_p$  from the following regression as liquidity-timing ability:

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_p MKT_t(L_{m,t} - \overline{L_m}) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \varepsilon_{p,t}, \quad (6)$$

where  $L_{m,t}$  is the [Pástor–Stambaugh \(2003\)](#) liquidity measure in month  $t$  and  $\overline{L_m}$  is the time-series mean of market liquidity measures across all months in the sample.

To calculate  $L_{m,t}$ , we select all A-share stocks in the Chinese market from January 1996 to December 2011. We eliminate all stocks with a closing price over 1000 yuan or under 2 yuan in any day during this period. Stocks with an observation period of  $< 15$  days in any given month are dropped as well. For each A-share Chinese stock  $i$  in each month  $t$ , its liquidity measure  $L_{m,t}$  in month  $t$  is obtained from the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned} r_{i,d+1,t}^e &= \theta_{i,t} + \phi_{i,t} r_{i,d,t} + L_{i,t} \text{sign}(r_{i,d,t}^e) v_{i,d,t} + \varepsilon_{i,d+1,t}, \\ d &= 1, \dots, D_{i,t}, \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

where  $r_{i,d,t}$  is the daily return of stock  $i$  on day  $d$  in month  $t$ ;  $r_{i,d,t}^e$  is the daily return of stock  $i$  in excess of the market return on day  $d$  in month  $t$ ;  $v_{i,d,t}$  is the volume (in yuan) for stock  $i$  on day  $d$  in month  $t$ , standardized by the average daily trading volume (7 million yuan) of A-share Chinese stocks in 2006; and  $D_{i,t}$  is the number of trading days in month  $t$ . Controlling for lagged excess stock returns,  $L_{i,t}$  measures the expected return reversal for a given volume and is expected to be negative and greater in magnitude if stock  $i$  is less liquid. The market liquidity measure in month  $t$  is then calculated as the average liquidity measure across individual stocks:

$$L_{m,t} = (m_{t-1}/m_1) \left( \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_t} L_{i,t}}{N_t} \right), \quad (8)$$

where  $N_t$  is the number of stocks available in month  $t$ . Since the size of the equity market increases over time, the liquidity measure is scaled by market size at the beginning of the daily sample in the CSMAR database, where  $m_{t-1}$  is the total market value of all sample stocks at the end of month  $t-1$ , with month 1 referring to January 1996.

## 3. Empirical analysis

In this section, we examine whether mutual fund managers time the market, volatility, and liquidity by the cross-sectional distribution of t-statistics for the timing coefficients of each mutual fund and reveal the baseline findings. Then, we employ a bootstrap analysis to test the significance of the baseline result. We further demonstrate that Chinese mutual fund managers' timing

**Table 2**

Cross-sectional distribution of t-statistics for the timing coefficients across individual funds.

This table summarizes the distribution of t-statistics for the timing coefficients. For each fund with at least 36 monthly return observations, we estimate the Treynor–Mazuy market-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t^2 + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

the Henriksson–Merton market-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMax(MKT_t, 0) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

the volatility-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t(V_{m,t} - \overline{V_m}) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

and the liquidity-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t(L_{m,t} - \overline{L_m}) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \varepsilon_{p,t},$$

where  $r_{p,t}$  is the excess return on each individual fund in month  $t$ . The independent variables include the market excess return (MKT), a size factor (SMB), a book-to-market value factor (HML), and a momentum factor (MOM). The term  $MKT_t^2$  is the square of the monthly market excess return in month  $t$ ,  $V_{m,t}$  is the market volatility-timing measure in month  $t$ ,  $\overline{V_m}$  is the mean of market volatility,  $L_{m,t}$  is the market liquidity measure in month  $t$ , and  $\overline{L_m}$  is the mean of market liquidity. The coefficient  $\gamma_p$  measures the market-timing ability, the volatility-timing ability, and the liquidity-timing ability in the three models, respectively. The table reports the percentage of funds for which the t-statistics of the timing coefficient exceed the indicated values.

	Percentage of funds					
	$t \leq -2.326$	$t \leq -1.960$	$t \leq -1.645$	$t \geq 1.645$	$t \geq 1.960$	$t \geq 2.326$
Market timing, Treynor	1.07	1.07	1.43	35.71	28.57	22.14
Market timing, Henriksson	0.00	1.43	2.50	40.00	33.57	24.29
Volatility timing	16.43	23.93	31.43	2.86	2.14	1.43
Liquidity timing	0.36	0.71	1.07	28.93	22.50	16.43

skill can indeed add economic value for investors.

### 3.1. Cross-sectional distribution of the t-statistics of timing abilities

We test market timing, volatility timing, and liquidity timing for individual funds using Eqs. (3) to (6), respectively.

Table 2 reports the cross-sectional distribution of t-statistics for timing measures across individual funds. We observe the percentage of t-statistics greater than the indicated cutoff values. For example, the percentages of Chinese mutual funds that have t-statistics of the Treynor–Mazuy market-timing, Henriksson–Merton market-timing, and liquidity-timing measures  $> 1.645$  are around 35.7%, 40.0%, and 28.9%, respectively. This result shows that the right tails of the whole sample are thicker than the left tails. Volatility-timing measures display the opposite trend, with 31.4% of sample funds lower than  $-1.645$ . The distribution of t-statistics suggests that all three types of timing abilities significantly exist in Chinese equity-oriented and mixed mutual funds.

However, some funds might have significant t-statistics due to chance. In other words, when the sample is large, some funds can appear to exhibit significant timing ability even though in actuality no funds have timing ability. In addition, if funds invest with a similar strategy, their performance will display a similar pattern, which means their timing measures are dependent. Thus, the cross-sectional evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of Chinese mutual fund timing ability. In the next section, we use a bootstrap method to estimate if timing coefficients reflect true timing skills or are due to pure luck.

### 3.2. Bootstrap tests

Following the methodology of Kosowski et al. (2006) and Jiang et al. (2007), we use a bootstrap analysis to derive statistical inferences for three timing measures at the individual fund level. The main procedure of the bootstrap analysis is the random resampling and construction of a group of hypothetical funds with the same factor loadings as the original sample but devoid of any timing ability. Then we compare the timing coefficients between the actual and hypothetical funds.

Using the Treynor–Mazuy market-timing measure as an example, we first estimate the timing model in Eq. (3) for each fund  $p$  and retain the parameter estimates  $\{\alpha_p, \gamma_p, \beta_{p,1}, \beta_{p,2}, \beta_{p,3}, \beta_{p,4}\}$ , as well as a time series of residuals  $\{\varepsilon_{p,t}\}$ . We then randomly resample the residuals and generate a time series of bootstrapped residuals  $\{\varepsilon_{p,t}^b\}$ , where  $b$  is an index for the bootstrap iteration ( $b = 1, 2, \dots, B$ ). Next, we construct a pseudo-fund with no timing skills (i.e.,  $\gamma_p = 0$ ) and generate a time series of bootstrapped returns,  $\{r_{p,t}^b\}$ , as follows:

$$r_{p,t}^b = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \varepsilon_{p,t}^b. \tag{9}$$

**Table 3**

Bootstrap analyses of market, volatility, and liquidity timing.

This table presents the results of the bootstrap analysis of market timing, volatility timing, and liquidity timing. For each fund, we estimate the Treynor–Mazuy market-timing model, the Henriksson–Merton market-timing model, the volatility-timing model, and the liquidity-timing model.

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t^2 + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

the Henriksson–Merton market-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_p\text{Max}(MKT_t, 0) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

the volatility-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t(V_{m,t} - \overline{V_m}) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

and the liquidity-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t(L_{m,t} - \overline{L_m}) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \varepsilon_{p,t},$$

where  $r_{p,t}$  is the excess return on each individual fund in month  $t$ . The independent variables include the market excess return (MKT), a size factor (SMB), a book-to-market value factor (HML), and a momentum factor (MOM). The term  $MKT$

We estimate the Treynor–Mazuy market-timing model (3) by using the pseudo-fund returns  $\{r_{p,t}^b\}$  from the above steps. By construction, the bootstrapped market-timing estimate should be zero. Therefore, any non-zero bootstrapped market-timing estimate  $\{\hat{\gamma}_p^b\}$  and its t-statistic  $\{t_{\hat{\gamma}_p^b}^b\}$  are purely due to sampling variation.

We repeat this process for all funds and obtain the cross-sectional statistics of the bootstrapped market-timing measures. We repeat the above steps for 1000 iterations to generate the empirical distribution of t-statistics for the pseudo-funds. Finally, we compare the values of the bootstrapped cross-sectional statistic (e.g., the top 10th percentile) from the iterations with the actual values of the cross-sectional statistics in the previous section and then determine whether the market-timing estimate can be explained by random sampling variation. If a large portion of the values of the bootstrapped cross-sectional statistics (e.g., the top 10th percentile) are greater than the value of the prior cross-sectional statistic, then our results in Table 2 are doubtful.

We also perform the above analysis on the Henriksson–Merton market-timing measure, volatility-timing measure, and liquidity-timing measure, respectively. Table 3 reports the top and bottom percentiles (1% to 10%) of the t-statistics and their p-values of the timing measures across individual Chinese funds from the bootstrap analysis. The results suggest that the top 1%, 3%, 5%, and 10% of Chinese mutual funds have a Treynor–Mazuy market-timing measure  $t_{\hat{\gamma}}^b$  of 6.40, 4.66, 4.21, and 3.51, respectively, with empirical p-values all close to zero. Similar results hold for the Henriksson–Merton market-timing measure and liquidity-timing measure, which have  $t_{\hat{\gamma}}^b$  values of 3.40 and 3.02 for the top 10% of Chinese mutual funds, respectively. Different from other timing measures, mutual fund market betas respond negatively to market volatility according to Busse (1999). Table 3 shows that the volatility-timing measure is significant and negative, that is, has a  $t_{\hat{\gamma}}^b$  of  $-2.77$  for the bottom 10%, with an empirical p-value close to zero. For at least 10% mutual funds, there exists a strong negative relation between funds' market exposure levels and market volatility. This finding suggests that when the market volatility is higher than average, mutual fund managers reduce their exposure to the market and decrease the fund systematic risk level, consistent with Busse's (1999) work. To summarize, we can conclude that the top-ranked timing coefficients, including return timing, volatility timing, and liquidity timing, are not due to luck. In other words, we confirm the existence of all three timing abilities for top-ranked Chinese mutual fund managers.

Fig. 3.1 plots the kernel density distribution of the bootstrapped 10th percentile t-statistics of the Treynor–Mazuy market-timing measure, the Henriksson–Merton market-timing measure, the volatility-timing measure, and the liquidity-timing measure, respectively. The vertical lines show the actual t-statistics of the timing measures for the sample funds. These graphs indicate that the distribution of bootstrapped t-statistics is non-normal, unlike the conventional significance level under the normality assumption. Figs. 3.2 and 3.3 also plot the kernel density distribution of the bootstrapped fifth and first percentile t-statistics of the timing




Fig. 3.1. The t-statistics of market timing using the Treynor–Mazuy and Henriksson–Merton models and the volatility-timing and liquidity-timing coefficients for the top 10th percentile, comparing actual funds with bootstrapped funds.

This figure plots the kernel density estimates of the bootstrapped t-statistics of different timing coefficients for the top 10th percentile in each of 1000 bootstrap simulations for the cross section of sample funds (solid lines), as well as the actual t-statistics of different timing coefficients for the top 10th percentile (dashed vertical lines).

measures, respectively. All the results are consistent. In sum, evidence from the bootstrap analysis indicates that top-ranked Chinese mutual fund managers can time market returns, market volatility, and market liquidity.

### 3.3. Economic value of timing measures

In this section, we aim to answer whether these timing skills can provide significant economic value for investors by examining the investment value of selected top timers. Our empirical work in this section can help investors evaluate the timing skills of Chinese mutual fund managers.

We calculate the timing coefficients in each month for each fund by using the past 36-month estimation period and then form 10 decile portfolios based on their coefficients  $\{\gamma_p\}$  for the Treynor–Mazuy market-timing measure, the Henriksson–Merton market-timing measure, the volatility-timing measure, and the liquidity-timing measure, respectively. We then hold these portfolios for three, six, nine, and 12 months, respectively, and calculate their returns based on different levels of timing skills.

Table 4 presents the economic value of the Treynor–Mazuy market-timing ability. The top 10% of market timers have significant alphas in the post-ranking period, while the bottom 10% of market timers do not have significant alphas. The top 10% market timers achieve a return of 1.16% with a t-statistic of 2.93 when the holding period is three months and they can acquire a 0.96% return with a t-statistic of 2.63 when the holding period is 12 months. The top market timers significantly outperform bottom timers by 0.67% when the holding period is three months. However, as the holding period increases, the significance of this outperformance decreases.

Table 5 shows the economic value of Henriksson–Merton market timers. The top 10% of Henriksson–Merton market timers have significant alphas: 1.07, 1.01, 0.95, and 0.91 for holding periods of three, six, nine, and 12 months, respectively. The impact of market timers decreases as the holding period increases. These results are similar to those for Treynor–Mazuy market timers.

Table 6 shows that the volatility timers also have the same performance as market timers. For example, the top 10% of volatility






Fig. 3.2. The t-statistics of market timing using the Treynor–Mazuy and Henriksson–Merton models and the volatility-timing and liquidity-timing coefficients for the top 5th percentile, comparing actual funds with bootstrapped funds.

This figure plots the kernel density estimates of the bootstrapped t-statistics of the different timing coefficients for the top fifth percentile in each of 1000 bootstrap simulations for the cross section of sample funds (solid lines), as well as the actual t-statistics of the different timing coefficients for the top fifth percentile (dashed vertical lines).

timers have significant alphas: 0.86, 0.77, 0.71, and 0.66 for holding periods of three, six, nine, and 12 months, respectively. Generally, their performance is weaker than that of market timers.

Table 7 presents the economic value of the liquidity-timing ability. Top liquidity timers also have significant alphas in the post-ranking period, although the alphas decrease as the holding period increases. For example, the top 10% of liquidity timers' portfolios have a significant alpha of 1.14 for a holding period of three months but it decreases to 1.10 after a holding period of 12 months. The bottom timers do not have significant outperformance either.

In sum, we find that the three timing skills indeed add economic value for Chinese mutual fund investors and the timing coefficients reflect the managerial skills in a pragmatic way. These results also indicate that market timing is an effective investment strategy that can provide significant alphas for mutual fund managers.

#### 4. Further analysis

In this section, we test the timing skills results for robustness. We address concerns for the time-series correlation of timing measures, the impact of bond returns, and the shock of the financial crisis. Then, we consider the correlations between the three types of timing abilities. Finally, we examine the timing ability of fund categories with different investment styles separately.

##### 4.1. Controlling for time-series correlation

The bootstrap analysis used in Section 3.2 assumes that the residuals from the timing regressions are independent. However, we are concerned that the residuals could exhibit serial dependence over time. To remove the effects of the serial correlation of residuals,

we conduct a bootstrap analysis by controlling for lagging market conditions in month  $t$  using the following equations:

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_p MKT_t^2 + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,6}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}MOM_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t}, \quad (10)$$

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_p \text{Max}(MKT_t, 0) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,6}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}MOM_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t},$$

**Table 4**

Economic value of market timing using the Treynor–Mazuy model, with evidence from out-of-sample alphas.

This table presents the out-of-sample alphas for the portfolios consisting of funds at diff

---

---

---

**Table 8** reports the distribution of t-statistics of timing measures by controlling for lagging market factors from the bootstrapped samples. The top (1–10%) t-statistics of the market- and liquidity-timing measures still have significant positive and strong t-statistics compared with the previous bootstrap analysis and are even stronger. For example, the top 10% of Chinese mutual funds have  $t_{\hat{\tau}}$  values of 3.81, 3.58, and 3.24 for the Treynor–Mazuy market-timing measure, the Henriksson–Merton market-timing measure, and the liquidity measure, respectively. Previously these measures were 3.51, 3.40, and 3.02, respectively, without controlling for lagged market conditions ([Table 3](#)). The volatility-timing measures of the bottom 10% also have stronger and negative t-statistics of  $-2.96$

**Table 6**

Economic value of volatility timing, with evidence from out-of-sample alphas.

This table presents the out-of-sample alphas for the portfolios consisting of funds at different levels of volatility-timing skill. In each month, we form 10 decile portfolios based on the funds' volatility-timing coefficients estimated from the past 36 months (i.e., ranking period) and then hold these portfolios for different holding periods of  $K$  months. The table reports the out-of-sample four-factor alphas (in percent per month) estimated from the post-ranking returns. The t-statistics calculated based on Newey–West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors with one lag are reported in parentheses.

	$K = 3$	6	9	12
Portfolio 1 (top timers)	0.86 (2.55)	0.77 (2.57)	0.71 (2.62)	0.66 (2.63)
Portfolio 2	0.68 (2.23)	0.65 (2.34)	0.63 (2.21)	0.62 (2.12)
Portfolio 3	0.76 (2.50)	0.71 (2.41)	0.75 (2.30)	0.78 (2.29)
Portfolio 4	0.91 (2.61)	0.79 (2.67)	0.80 (2.79)	0.78 (2.79)
Portfolio 5	0.92 (2.70)	0.87 (2.86)	0.85 (2.88)	0.86 (2.88)
Portfolio 6	0.69 (2.41)	0.71 (2.43)	0.68 (2.29)	0.68 (2.37)
Portfolio 7	0.80 (2.81)	0.84 (2.91)	0.84 (3.04)	0.86 (3.14)
Portfolio 8	0.54 (2.08)	0.58 (2.12)	0.53 (2.02)	0.58 (2.23)
Portfolio 9	0.67 (2.82)	0.71 (2.87)	0.78 (3.12)	0.80 (3.11)
Portfolio 10 (bottom timers)	0.34 (1.53)	0.49 (1.90)	0.54 (1.85)	0.47 (1.55)
Spread (Port. 1–Port. 10)	0.52 (2.14)	0.28 (1.39)	0.16 (0.81)	0.19 (0.87)

(– 2.77 in Table 3). Even after the time series influence is considered, the top-ranked Chinese mutual fund managers still show significant t-statistics for timing ability.

#### 4.2. Controlling for bond market conditions

We construct timing models based on the standard Carhart (1997) four-factor model; however, many Chinese equity-oriented and

**Table 7**

Economic value of liquidity timing, with evidence from out-of-sample alphas.

This table presents the out-of-sample alphas for the portfolios consisting of funds at different levels of liquidity-timing skill. In each month, we form 10 decile portfolios based on the funds' liquidity-timing coefficients estimated from the past 36 months (i.e., ranking period) and then hold these portfolios for different holding periods of  $K$  months. The table reports the out-of-sample four-factor alphas (in percent per month) estimated from the post-ranking returns. The t-statistics calculated based on Newey–West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors with one lag are reported in parentheses.

	$K = 3$	6	9	12
Portfolio 1 (top timers)	1.14 (3.08)	1.18 (2.96)	1.11 (2.74)	1.10 (2.73)
Portfolio 2	0.83 (2.89)	0.71 (2.61)	0.67 (2.44)	0.65 (2.36)
Portfolio 3	0.78 (2.80)	0.79 (2.83)	0.81 (2.86)	0.80 (2.74)
Portfolio 4	0.71 (2.20)	0.73 (2.65)	0.66 (2.49)	0.60 (2.50)
Portfolio 5	0.70 (2.91)	0.67 (2.78)	0.62 (2.78)	0.58 (2.73)
Portfolio 6	0.54 (2.58)	0.59 (2.78)	0.63 (2.95)	0.67 (3.03)
Portfolio 7	0.75 (2.83)	0.77 (2.87)	0.77 (2.81)	0.79 (2.92)
Portfolio 8	0.66 (2.21)	0.68 (2.30)	0.72 (2.33)	0.75 (2.35)
Portfolio 9	0.54 (1.75)	0.61 (1.74)	0.70 (1.91)	0.76 (2.04)
Portfolio 10 (bottom timers)	0.57 (1.25)	0.53 (1.37)	0.53 (1.42)	0.54 (1.42)
Spread (Port. 1–Port. 10)	0.57 (1.59)	0.65 (2.59)	0.58 (2.53)	0.57 (2.61)

**Table 8**

This table presents the results of the bootstrap analysis of market timing, volatility timing, and liquidity timing, controlling for time series correlation. For each fund with at least 36 monthly return observations, we estimate the Treynor–Mazuy market-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t^2 + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,6}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}MOM_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

the Henriksson–Merton market-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMax(MKT_t, 0) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,6}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}MOM_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

the volatility-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t(V_{m,t} - \bar{V}_m) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,6}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}MOM_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

and the liquidity-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t(L_{m,t} - \bar{L}_m) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,6}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}MOM_{t-1} + \beta_{p,9}LIQ_t + \varepsilon_{p,t},$$

where  $r_{p,t}$  is the excess return on each individual fund in month  $t$ . The independent variables include the market excess return (MKT), a size factor (SMB), a book-to-market value factor (HML), and a momentum factor (MOM). The term  $MKT_t^2$  is the square of the monthly market excess return in month  $t$ ,  $V_{m,t}$  is the market volatility-timing measure in month  $t$ ,  $\bar{V}_m$  is the mean of market volatility,  $L_{m,t}$  is the market liquidity measure in month  $t$ ,  $\bar{L}_m$  is the mean of market liquidity, and  $LIQ_t$  is the Pástor–Stambaugh (2003) liquidity risk factor for month  $t$ , measured as innovations in market liquidity from an AR(2) model. The coefficient  $\gamma_p$  measures liquidity-timing ability. The first row reports the sorted t-statistics of the timing coefficients across individual funds in each timing model and the second row shows the empirical p-values from the bootstrap simulations. The number of resampling iterations is 1000.

		Bottom t-statistics for $\hat{\gamma}$				Top t-statistics for $\hat{\gamma}$			
		1%	3%	5%	10%	10%	5%	3%	1%
Market timing	t-Stat	-2.57	-1.83	-1.53	-0.90	3.81	4.69	5.09	6.81
Treynor model	p-Value	0.18	0.23	0.28	0.91	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Market timing	t-Stat	-2.37	-1.60	-1.28	-0.71	3.58	4.13	4.58	5.32
Henriksson model	p-Value	0.45	0.85	0.97	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Volatility timing	t-Stat	-4.34	-3.71	-3.60	-2.96	0.62	1.19	1.66	2.50
	p-Value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.99	0.68	0.18
Liquidity timing	t-Stat	-2.50	-1.83	-1.41	-1.08	3.24	3.77	4.18	4.89
	p-Value	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

mixed mutual funds also invest in the bond markets. The returns on the bond markets should also be considered part of market conditions; thus, we add the monthly Treasury bond yield change to the market controls:

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t^2 + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}BOND_t + \beta_{p,6}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,9}MOM_{t-1} + \beta_{p,10}BOND_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t}, \tag{14}$$

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMax(MKT_t, 0) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}BOND_t + \beta_{p,6}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,9}MOM_{t-1} + \beta_{p,10}BOND_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t}, \tag{15}$$

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t(V_{m,t} - \bar{V}_m) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}BOND_t + \beta_{p,6}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,9}MOM_{t-1} + \beta_{p,10}BOND_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t}, \tag{16}$$

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t(L_{m,t} - \bar{L}_m) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}BOND_t + \beta_{p,6}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,9}MOM_{t-1} + \beta_{p,10}LIQ_t + \beta_{p,11}BOND_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t}. \tag{17}$$

Table 9 reports the distribution of the t-statistics of the timing measures from Eqs. (14) to (17). Comparing the results in Table 9 with those in Tables 3 and 8, we find that the evidence of timing measures remains unchanged after we control for bond market conditions and the liquidity risk factor. For example, the top 10% Treynor–Mazuy market timers have a significant positive t-statistic of 4.00, which is slightly greater than the 3.81 reported in Table 8 and greater than the 3.51 reported in Table 3, with a p-value still close to zero. The results of other timing measures are also consistent with the previous ones in Tables 3 and 8.

### 4.3. Excluding the 2008–2009 crisis period

In the crisis period from 2008 to 2009, the Chinese stock market confronted dramatic changes. To exclude the influence of extreme market conditions, we remove the 2008–2009 financial crisis period from our sample to examine the timing measures. A bootstrap analysis is conducted for Eqs. (14) to (17) using the revised sample and the results are shown in Table 10. The results

**Table 9**

This table presents the results of the bootstrap analysis of market timing, volatility timing, and liquidity timing, controlling for bond returns. For each fund with at least 36 monthly return observations, we estimate the Treynor–Mazuy market-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t^2 + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}BOND_t + \beta_{p,6}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,9}MOM_{t-1} + \beta_{p,10}BOND_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

the Henriksson–Merton market-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_p\text{Max}(MKT_t, 0) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}BOND_t + \beta_{p,6}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,9}MOM_{t-1} + \beta_{p,10}BOND_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

the volatility-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t(V_{m,t} - \bar{V}_m) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}BOND_t + \beta_{p,6}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,9}MOM_{t-1} + \beta_{p,10}BOND_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

and the liquidity-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t(L_{m,t} - \bar{L}_m) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}BOND_t + \beta_{p,6}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,9}MOM_{t-1} + \beta_{p,10}LIQ_t + \beta_{p,11}BOND_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

where  $r_{p,t}$  is the excess return on each individual fund in month  $t$ . The independent variables include the market excess return (MKT), a size factor (SMB), a book-to-market value factor (HML), and a momentum factor (MOM). The term  $MKT_t^2$  is the square of the monthly market excess return in month  $t$ ,  $V_{m,t}$  is the market volatility-timing measure in month  $t$ ,  $\bar{V}_m$  is the mean of market volatility,  $L_{m,t}$  is the market liquidity measure in month  $t$ ,  $\bar{L}_m$  is the mean of market liquidity, and  $LIQ_t$  is the Pástor–Stambaugh (2003) liquidity risk factor for month  $t$ , measured as innovations in market liquidity from an AR(2) model. The coefficient  $\gamma_p$  measures liquidity-timing ability. The first row reports the sorted t-statistics of the timing coefficients across individual funds in each timing model and the second row shows the empirical p-values from the bootstrap simulations. The number of resampling iterations is 1000.

		Bottom t-statistics for $\hat{\gamma}$				Top t-statistics for $\hat{\gamma}$			
		1%	3%	5%	10%	10%	5%	3%	1%
Market timing	t-Stat	-3.40	-1.82	-1.62	-1.12	4.00	4.75	5.17	7.13
Treynor model	p-Value	0.00	0.34	0.15	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Market timing	t-Stat	-2.77	-1.65	-1.29	-0.74	3.66	4.38	4.73	5.52
Henriksson model	p-Value	0.05	0.65	0.93	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Volatility timing	t-Stat	-4.48	-3.58	-3.35	-2.86	0.63	1.23	1.71	2.47
	p-Value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.87	0.52
Liquidity timing	t-Stat	-2.92	-1.87	-1.57	-1.10	3.25	3.85	4.11	5.04
	p-Value	0.18	0.70	0.77	0.93	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

indicate that the top Chinese mutual fund timers still deliver strong and positive timing skills. For example, the top 10% Treynor–Mazuy market timers have a significant positive t-statistic of 3.98, which is similar to the 4.00 reported in Table 9. The Henriksson–Merton timing measures and liquidity timing measures are also consistent with previous results. The bottom 10% of volatility market timers have a significant negative t-statistic of -2.10, which is slightly lower in magnitude than the -2.86 in Table 9.

#### 4.4. Correlations between the three timing abilities

In this section, we document the correlations between fund managers' abilities to time market returns, volatility and liquidity, and derive some findings. We sort the whole sample into five equal groups based on the t-statistics of market, volatility and liquidity timing coefficients, respectively.

In Table 11, within each timing group, we present the percentage of t-statistics of the other three timing measures exceeding the indicated cutoff values. The results suggest that each timing measure is positively relevant to the other three timing measures. Specifically, in regard to market timing, we find that funds in the high market-timing groups exhibit high proportions of funds with volatility- and liquidity-timing abilities. In addition, market-return timing ability is more related to liquidity timing ability than volatility timing ability. However, the relevance between volatility timing ability and liquidity timing ability is weak.

We also conduct a correlation analysis between t-statistics of the three timing coefficients and the results are consistent. Specifically, the correlation coefficients between Treynor–Mazuy and Henriksson–Merton market timing and liquidity timing abilities are 0.798 and 0.747, respectively. The correlation coefficients between Treynor–Mazuy and Henriksson–Merton market timing and volatility timing ability are slightly small, with 0.492 and 0.484. However, the correlation coefficient between volatility and liquidity timing ability is merely 0.237.

These correlations can be interpreted from several aspects. First, in general, the correlations between the three timing abilities are all positive, suggesting that when a mutual fund manager has one aspect of timing ability, he is more likely to possess the other two

**Table 10**

This table presents the results of the bootstrap analysis of market timing, volatility timing, and liquidity timing, excluding the 2008–2009 crisis period. For each fund with at least 36 monthly return observations, we exclude the 2008–2009 financial crisis period and estimate the Treynor–Mazuy market-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t^2 + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}BOND_t + \beta_{p,6}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,9}MOM_{t-1} + \beta_{p,10}BOND_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

the Henriksson–Merton market-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_p\text{Max}(MKT_t, 0) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}BOND_t + \beta_{p,6}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,9}MOM_{t-1} + \beta_{p,10}BOND_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

the volatility-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t(V_{m,t} - \overline{V_m}) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}BOND_t + \beta_{p,6}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,9}MOM_{t-1} + \beta_{p,10}BOND_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

and the liquidity-timing model,

$$r_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p,1}MKT_t + \gamma_pMKT_t(L_{m,t} - \overline{L_m}) + \beta_{p,2}SMB_t + \beta_{p,3}HML_t + \beta_{p,4}MOM_t + \beta_{p,5}BOND_t + \beta_{p,6}MKT_{t-1} + \beta_{p,7}SMB_{t-1} + \beta_{p,8}HML_{t-1} + \beta_{p,9}MOM_{t-1} + \beta_{p,10}LIQ_t + \beta_{p,11}BOND_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{p,t};$$

where  $r_{p,t}$  is the excess return on each individual fund in month  $t$ . The independent variables include the market excess return (MKT), a size factor (SMB), a book-to-market value factor (HML), and a momentum factor (MOM). The term  $MKT_t^2$  is the square of the monthly market excess return in month  $t$ ,  $V_{m,t}$  is the market volatility-timing measure in month  $t$ ,  $\overline{V_m}$  is the mean of market volatility,  $L_{m,t}$  is the market liquidity measure in month  $t$ ,  $\overline{L_m}$  is the mean of market liquidity, and  $LIQ_t$  is the Pástor–Stambaugh (2003) liquidity risk factor for month  $t$ , measured as innovations in market liquidity from an AR(2) model. The coefficient  $\gamma_p$  measures liquidity-timing ability. The first row reports the sorted t-statistics of the timing coefficients across individual funds for each timing ability and the second row shows the empirical p-values from the bootstrap simulations. The number of resampling iterations is 1000.

		Bottom t-statistics for $\hat{\gamma}$				Top t-statistics for $\hat{\gamma}$			
		1%	3%	5%	10%	10%	5%	3%	1%
Market timing	t-Stat	-2.99	-2.59	-2.43	-1.72	3.98	4.80	5.36	7.65
Treynor model	p-Value	0.38	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Market timing	t-Stat	-2.10	-1.41	-1.18	-0.97	3.92	5.28	5.39	5.89
Henriksson model	p-Value	0.96	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Volatility timing	t-Stat	-3.43	-3.22	-2.65	-2.10	1.05	2.09	2.34	3.67
	p-Value	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.17	0.24	0.05
Liquidity timing	t-Stat	-3.64	-2.92	-2.77	-2.41	2.97	3.77	4.59	6.11
	p-Value	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

aspects of timing abilities. Existing papers have proved that market liquidity comoves with market returns and predicts future returns (e.g., Amihud, 2002; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). As an example, market-wide liquid deteriorates during the 2008 financial crisis was accompanied by a collapse in U.S. market-wide stock prices. Thus, a manager who is capable of forecasting the market-wide liquidity correctly are more likely to forecast the market returns and adjust his portfolio exposure, and vice versa. In addition, the possible explanation for the less strong relationship between volatility and other two types of timing abilities is that some good market return or liquidity timers have incentives to respond to volatility adversely, by increasing funds' exposures when volatility is predicted to be high, documented by Ferson and Mo (2016). The reason is that the relation between fund managers' payoffs and the fund's performance is usually option-like or convex. Therefore, the adverse volatility-related behaviors of some good market return or liquidity timers lead to the slightly weaker relationship between volatility and other two types of timing skills.

#### 4.5. Investment style and timing

Thus far, we find that there are many Chinese mutual funds exhibiting successful timing ability. However, one possibility is that the significant timing abilities are driven by some funds with specific investment styles. For example, Giambona and Golec (2009) document a significant relation between the direction of volatility timing and fund investment style and they find conservative funds become more aggressive when market volatility is high. Understanding whether different investment-style categories lead to different results for timing could be meaningful for both researchers and investors. To investigate if timing abilities vary with fund investment style, we categorize our sample funds by investment styles into 181 growth funds, 43 blend funds, and 56 value funds.<sup>6</sup> Then we repeat the tests of Table 2 for the three fund categories separately.

<sup>6</sup> Data source: CSMAR Database.

**Table 11**

This table presents the correlations between fund managers' abilities to time market returns, volatility and liquidity. We sort the whole sample into five equal groups based on the t-statistics of market, volatility and liquidity timing coefficients, respectively. We repeat the tests of Table 2 for the fund categories separately. Within each timing group, we present the percentage of t-statistics of the other three timing measures exceeding the indicated cutoff values.

Market timing-Treynor model	N	Market Henriksson (t > = 1.645)	Volatility (t < = - 1.645)	Liquidity (t > = 1.645)
Low	56	0.00	3.57	1.79
2	56	0.00	23.21	0.00
3	56	12.50	25.00	17.86
4	56	85.71	53.57	39.29
High	56	100.00	51.79	87.50
Market timing-Henriksson model	N	Market Treynor (t > = 1.645)	Volatility (t < = - 1.645)	Liquidity (t > = 1.645)
Low	56	0.00	8.93	1.79
2	56	0.00	16.07	3.57
3	56	5.36	28.57	19.64
4	56	73.21	51.79	32.14
High	56	100.00	51.79	89.29
Volatility timing	N	Market Treynor (t > = 1.645)	Market Henriksson (t > = 1.645)	Liquidity (t > = 1.645)
Low	56	67.86	75.00	42.86
2	56	41.07	48.21	35.71
3	56	30.36	28.57	26.79
4	56	26.79	32.14	23.21
High	56	12.50	14.29	17.86
Liquidity timing	N	Market Treynor (t > = 1.645)	Market Henriksson (t > = 1.645)	Volatility (t < = - 1.645)
Low	56	0.00	1.79	10.71
2	56	3.57	5.36	25.00
3	56	21.43	33.93	33.93
4	56	64.29	69.64	46.43
High	56	89.29	87.50	41.07

Like Table 2, we present the percentage of t-statistics exceeding the different indicated cutoff values for the three subsamples separately. As shown in Table 12, in the case of the Treynor–Mazuy market-timing model, the percentages of growth, blend and value funds that demonstrate true market timing ability at the 10% level are 39.53%, 33.70%, and 39.29%, respectively. In sum, there is no

**Table 12**

This table presents the distribution of t-statistics for the timing coefficients of growth, blend, value funds, respectively. The sample funds are categorized by investment styles into three groups, including 181 growth funds, 43 blend funds, and 56 value funds. The timing models that we use are the same as those in Table 2. This table reports the percentage of t-statistics exceeding the indicated cutoff values for the three subsamples separately.

	Percentage of funds					
	t ≤ - 2.326	t ≤ - 1.960	t ≤ - 1.645	t ≥ 1.645	t ≥ 1.960	t ≥ 2.326
<b>Market timing, Treynor</b>						
Growth (181)	0.00	0.00	0.00	39.53	25.58	20.93
Blend (43)	1.66	1.66	2.21	33.70	28.18	21.55
Value (56)	0.00	0.00	0.00	39.29	32.14	25.00
<b>Market timing, Henriksson</b>						
Growth (181)	0.00	2.21	3.31	38.12	31.49	23.76
Blend (43)	0.00	0.00	2.33	48.84	39.53	23.26
Value (56)	0.00	0.00	0.00	37.50	35.71	26.79
<b>Volatility timing</b>						
Growth (181)	14.92	20.99	27.62	3.31	2.21	1.10
Blend (43)	16.28	30.23	44.19	0.00	0.00	0.00
Value (56)	21.43	28.57	33.93	3.57	3.57	3.57
<b>Liquidity timing</b>						
Growth (181)	0.55	1.10	1.66	29.83	23.76	16.57
Blend (43)	0.00	0.00	0.00	20.93	13.95	13.95
Value (56)	0.00	0.00	0.00	33.93	25.00	17.86



dramatic difference in the three timing abilities across the three types of funds, indicating that our main results are not driven by funds with specific investment styles.

## 5. Conclusion

We investigate the market-timing, volatility-timing, and liquidity-timing abilities of Chinese mutual fund managers. We use cross-sectional and bootstrap analyses and find strong evidence that Chinese mutual fund managers have timing skills. They increase (reduce) market exposure when the Chinese equity market advances (declines) or when the market exhibits less (more) volatility or more liquidity (illiquidity). In addition, the top timing funds outperform the bottom timing funds. These results indicate that the top Chinese mutual fund timers can add value for investors and timing measures can be important in Chinese mutual fund alphas.

We also conduct robustness checks of our findings and show that our inferences about timing measures hold in all the tests. Finally, timing measures are important in investment decision-making processes. Our findings regarding Chinese mutual fund managers' timing skills can boost investor confidence to invest in Chinese mutual funds.

## References

- Acharya, V.V., Pedersen, L.H., 2005. Asset pricing with liquidity risk. *J. Financ. Econ.* 77 (2), 375–410.
- Admati, A.R., Bhattacharya, S., Pfleiderer, P., Ross, S.A., 1986. On timing and selectivity. *J. Financ.* 41 (3), 715–730.
- Amihud, Y., 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects. *J. Financ. Mark.* 5 (1), 31–56.
- Blume, M.E., Keim, D.B., 2012. Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships. Unpublished working paper University of Pennsylvania.
- Bollen, N.P.B., Busse, J.A., 2001. On the timing ability of mutual fund managers. *J. Financ.* 56 (3), 1075–1094.
- Busse, J.A., 1999. Volatility-timing in mutual funds: evidence from daily returns. *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 12 (5), 1009–1041.
- Cao, C., Chen, Y., Liang, B., Lo, A.W., 2013a. Can hedge funds time market liquidity? *J. Financ. Econ.* 109 (2), 493–516.
- Cao, C., Simin, T.T., Wang, Y., 2013b. Do mutual fund managers time market liquidity? *J. Financ. Mark.* 16 (2), 279–307.
- Carhart, M.M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance. *J. Financ.* 52 (1), 57–82.
- Chan, K., Hameed, A., 2006. Stock price synchronicity and analyst coverage in emerging markets. *J. Financ. Econ.* 80 (1), 115–147.
- Chen, K., Chen, R., Zhang, X., Zhu, M., 2016. Chinese stock market return predictability: adaptive complete subset regressions. *Asia-Pac. J. Financ. Stud.* 45 (5), 779–804.
- Chen, R., Gao, Z., Zhang, X., Zhu, M., 2017. Mutual Fund managers' Prior Work Experience and Their Investment Skills. (Working Paper).
- Cuthbertson, K., Nitzsche, D., O'Sullivan, N., 2008. UK mutual fund performance: skill or luck? *J. Empir. Financ.* 15 (4), 613–634.
- Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. *J. Financ. Econ.* 33 (1), 3–56.
- Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 2010. Luck versus skill in the cross-section of mutual fund returns. *J. Financ.* 65 (5), 1915–1947.
- Ferson, W., Mo, H., 2016. Performance measurement with selectivity, market and volatility timing. *J. Financ. Econ.* 121 (1), 93–110.
- Ferson, W.E., Schadt, R.W., 1996. Measuring fund strategy and performance in changing economic conditions. *J. Financ.* 51 (2), 425–461.
- Giambona, E., Golec, J., 2009. Mutual fund volatility timing and management fees. *J. Bank. Financ.* 33 (4), 589–599.
- Henriksson, R.D., Merton, R.C., 1981. On market timing and investment performance. II. Statistical procedures for evaluating forecasting skills. *J. Bus.* 54 (4), 513–533.
- Jiang, G.J., Yao, T., Yu, T., 2007. Do mutual funds time the market? Evidence from portfolio holdings. *J. Financ. Econ.* 86 (2), 724–758.
- Kacperczyk, M., Nieuwerburgh, S.V., Veldkamp, L., 2014. Time-varying fund manager skill. *J. Financ.* 69 (4), 1455–1484.
- Kim, S., In, F., 2012. False discoveries in volatility timing of mutual funds. *J. Bank. Financ.* 36 (7), 2083–2094.
- Kosowski, R., Timmermann, A., Wermers, R., White, H., 2006. Can mutual fund “stars” really pick stocks? New evidence from a bootstrap analysis. *J. Financ.* 61 (6), 2551–2595.
- Li, N., Lin, C.Y., 2011. Understanding emerging market equity mutual funds: the case of China. *Financ. Serv. Rev.* 20 (1), 1–19.
- Liao, L., Liu, B., Wang, H., 2011. Information discovery in share lockups: evidence from the split-share structure reform in China. *Financ. Manag.* 40 (4), 1001–1027.
- Lin, S., Tian, S., Wu, E., 2013. Emerging stars and developed neighbors: the effects of development imbalance and political shocks on mutual fund investments in China. *Financ. Manag.* 42 (2), 339–371.
- Morck, R., Yeung, B., Yu, W., 2000. The information content of stock markets: why do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements? *J. Financ. Econ.* 58 (1), 215–260.
- Pástor, L., Stambaugh, R.F., 2003. Liquidity risk and expected stock returns. *J. Polit. Econ.* 111 (3), 642–685.
- Tang, K., Wang, W., Xu, R., 2012. Size and performance of Chinese mutual funds: the role of economy of scale and liquidity. *Pac. Basin Financ. J.* 20 (2), 228–246.
- Treynor, J.L., Mazuy, K., 1966. Can mutual funds outguess the market? *Harv. Bus. Rev.* 44 (4), 131–136.
- Yi, L., He, L., 2016. False discoveries in style timing of Chinese mutual funds. *Pac. Basin Financ. J.* 38, 194–208.