



2019

4

64

2019

2

1

Logit

GDP

60

2017

GDP
/GDP

1

0.40-0.68

“ ”

Research Report

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TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH

Early Warning Indicators of Financial Crisis

Center for Finance and Development

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Abstract

A rapidly growing macro-leverage ratio, measured by M2 to GDP ratio or private debt to GDP ratio, has provoked heated debates on increasing financial risks and the stance of macroprudential policies in China. Drawing on cross-country data between 1990 and 2010, we explore the explanatory factors for financial crises, using a panel logit model that considers variables such as GDP growth, external debt, savings rate, capital market openness, etc. We find that the private debt to GDP ratio has a strong explanatory power for the probability of financial crises, while the M2 to GDP ratio is not significantly correlated to financial crises. If the private debt to GDP ratio goes up by 1 percentage point in China, the probability of a banking crisis will increase by 0.40-0.68 percentage points. The following policy implications can be drawn from our research. Although policymakers must be cautious with financial risks stemming from an excess deleveraging process, it is important to understand that an increasing macro-leverage is the key warning indicator for financial crises. Given the high private debt to GDP ratio in China, a tightening policy stance that aims to deleverage the Chinese economy should be always in place in the medium to long run.

2009-2016

“ ”

Probit/Logit

Logit

100

22

Frankel

Rose(1996)

GDP

Logit

IMF

(Berg

Pattillo,1999a; Bussiere

Fratzscher,2006; Demirgüç-Kunt

Detragiache,2000; Frankel

Rose,1996)

Kaminsky (1998)

Berg

Pattillo(1999b)

(Frankel

Saravelos,2012)

(

, 2011)

Logit									
Probit					Logit				
Davis			Karim(2008)			Logit			
Reinhart	Rogoff(2011)								
			Frankel	Rose(1996)					
25%					Kaminsky, Lizondo				
Reinhart(1998)					15%				
Reinhart	Rogoff(2011)								
							2008-09		
Obstfeld	2009	2010	Rose	Spiegel	2010	Berkmen			
2009					Frankel	Saravelos			
2012					2009				
							2008-		
2009									

Borio Lowe 2002

2004

Schularick Taylor 2012 1870-2008

Gourinchas Obstfeld 2012

Reinhart Rogoff 2009 800

Drehmann Juselius 2013

Early Warning

Indicator

GDP

GDP

2009

2007

2008

24

24

2011

1993


2009

KLR	Logit
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2009

M2/GDP

/GDP



	1,428.00	0.21	0.40	0.00	1.00
	1,424.00	0.18	0.39	0.00	1.00
M2/GDP	1,121.00	56.55	37.94	10.56	232.92
M2/GDP	1,121.00	0.05	4.74	-33.04	81.25

/GDP	1,235.00	59.74	49.86	2.01	312.03
/GDP	1,235.00	0.06	5.39	-31.88	77.87
GDP	1,417.00	3.50	4.09	-23.98	33.74
/GDP	1,387.00	12.10	13.44	0.10	108.62
/GDP	756.00	62.28	81.87	2.93	1111.27
/GDP	1,259.00	9.46	11.75	-128.80	62.36
GDP	1,417.00	12.64	15.61	0.14	97.01
	1,293.00	0.61	0.37	0.00	1.00
/GDP	1,406.00	36.09	26.23	0.10	231.19

2.1	1428				0.2
1135	0		293		1
	1990	2010	20		
4					2008
2008					
	1992-1999				
	8				
1994					
1.5	8.6				
	1990-2010				
GDP					

2				
	2.2	2.3	GDP	
	/GDP	M2	GDP	M2/GDP
			2.2	
	/GDP			
	/GDP			
				2.3
M2/GDP				
	2.2		/GDP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
/GDP	0.0382***	0.0378***	0.0408***	0.0668***
	(0.0107)	(0.0107)	(0.0130)	(0.0176)
/GDP	0.0301***	0.0296***	0.0297***	0.0236***
	(0.00591)	(0.00599)	(0.00601)	(0.00725)
/GDP	-0.0852***	-0.0847***	-0.0862***	-0.147***
	(0.0223)	(0.0223)	(0.0227)	(0.0371)

GDP		-0.0145	-0.0140	0.0195
		(0.0328)	(0.0328)	(0.0414)
/GDP			-0.0128	-0.0472
			(0.0313)	(0.0383)
/GDP				-0.0294
				(0.0286)
				-1.987**
				(0.812)
/GDP				0.0442
				(0.0307)
	599	599	599	461
	32	32	32	25

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

2.3 M2/GDP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
M2/GDP	0.0188	0.0146	0.0217	0.0120
	(0.0121)	(0.0126)	(0.0144)	(0.0185)
/GDP	0.0263***	0.0257***	0.0262***	0.0207***
	(0.00556)	(0.00563)	(0.00571)	(0.00688)

	/GDP	-0.106*** (0.0249)	-0.0984*** (0.0254)	-0.105*** (0.0262)	-0.125*** (0.0384)
GDP			-0.0278 (0.0308)	-0.0271 (0.0310)	-0.0195 (0.0368)
M2/GDP				-0.0288 (0.0297)	-0.0113 (0.0424)
	/GDP				0.0171 (0.0252)
					-1.592** (0.724)
	/GDP				0.0118 (0.0276)
		604 32	603 32	603 32	466 25

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Logit

“ ” “ ”

2.4
2.4
1
/GDP

3.9%

2.4		/GDP		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
/GDP	1.039*** (0.0111)	1.039*** (0.0111)	1.042*** (0.0135)	1.069*** (0.0188)
/GDP	1.031*** (0.00609)	1.030*** (0.00617)	1.030*** (0.00619)	1.024*** (0.00743)
/GDP	0.918*** (0.0205)	0.919*** (0.0205)	0.917*** (0.0208)	0.863*** (0.0321)
GDP		0.986 (0.0324)	0.986 (0.0323)	1.020 (0.0423)
/GDP			0.987 (0.0309)	0.954 (0.0366)
/GDP				0.971 (0.0278)
/GDP				0.137** (0.111)
/GDP				1.045 (0.0321)
	599	599	599	461
	32	32	32	25

Logit

2017

/GDP

2.5

/GDP

0.40-0.68

2.5

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
/GDP	0.40	0.42	0.42	0.68
/GDP	0.30	0.31	0.32	0.24

3

/GDP

/GDP

/GDP

/GDP

M2/GDP

2.6

/GDP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)

	/GDP	0.0298***	0.0277**	0.0192	0.0319**
		(0.0113)	(0.0113)	(0.0136)	(0.0161)
	/GDP	0.0113***	0.00897**	0.00855**	0.0169***
		(0.00418)	(0.00415)	(0.00413)	(0.00612)
	/GDP	-0.137***	-0.131***	-0.127***	-0.0495
		(0.0283)	(0.0282)	(0.0282)	(0.0377)
GDP			-0.0611**	-0.0615**	-0.0168
			(0.0304)	(0.0304)	(0.0371)
	/GDP			0.0356	0.0300
				(0.0313)	(0.0385)
	/GDP				-0.0593**
					(0.0272)
					-2.027***
					(0.686)
	/GDP				-0.114***
					(0.0310)
		563	563	563	452
		30	30	30	26

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

2.7 M2/GDP

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
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M2/GDP	0.0130	0.00715	-0.0109	0.0125
	(0.0129)	(0.0132)	(0.0166)	(0.0225)
/GDP	0.00996**	0.00784**	0.00708*	0.0138**
	(0.00405)	(0.00388)	(0.00376)	(0.00625)
/GDP	-0.145***	-0.132***	-0.124***	-0.0536
	(0.0289)	(0.0292)	(0.0296)	(0.0396)
GDP		-0.0667**	-0.0703**	-0.0280
		(0.0304)	(0.0305)	(0.0364)
M2/GDP			0.0674**	0.0519
			(0.0329)	(0.0522)
/GDP				-0.0469*
				(0.0256)
				-1.926***
				(0.662)
/GDP				-0.118***
				(0.0322)
	568	567	567	457
	30	30	30	26

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

“ ”

60
Logit GDP
/GDP
M2/GDP
2017 /GDP 1
0.40-0.68

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% δ

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