主題：Pivots and Prestige Venture Capital Contracts with Experimentation

主講人：Martin Szydlowski，明尼蘇達大學卡爾森管理學院金融學助理教授

時間：4月7日（周三）上午10:00-11:30

地點：4-101教室

語言：英文

 

摘要：

We study venture capital financing with experimentation. An entrepreneur contracts with an investor and has private information about a project, which requires costly experimentation by both parties to succeed. In equilibrium, investors learn about the project from the arrival of exogenous information and from the entrepreneur’s contract offers. The optimal contract features vesting and dilution, consistent with empirical evidence. Pivots and prestige projects emerge as signaling devices. Technological progress, which lowers the cost of experimentation or which increases the rate of learning, makes entrepreneurs pivot more aggressively in equilibrium.

 

主講人介紹：

Martin Szydlowski is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota. His research examines how agency conflicts influence firm investment, capital structure, and the optimal mix of managerial incentives. He also studies the impact of ambiguity aversion on incentive contracts. Martin is teaching corporate finance to both undergraduate and PhD students. He holds a PhD in Economics from Northwestern University and a Diploma from the University of Mannheim, Germany.