主題：The Redistributive Effects of Bank Capital Regulation（銀行資本監管再分配效應）

主講人：Robert S. Marquez，加利福尼亞大學戴維斯分校金融學教授

日期：2017年11月1日（周三）

時間：上午10:00-11:30

地點：清華Betvictor中文版4号樓101教室

語言：英文

摘要：

We build a general equilibrium model of banks' optimal capital structure, where investors are reluctant to invest in financial products other than deposits, and where bankruptcy is costly. We first show that banks raise both deposits and equity, and that investors are willing to hold equity only if adequately compensated. We then introduce (binding) capital requirements and show that: (i) it distorts investment away from productive projects toward storage; or (ii) it increases the cost of raising capital for banks, with the bulk of this cost accruing to depositors. These results hold also when we extend the model to incorporate various rationales justifying capital regulation.

主講人簡介:

Robert Marquez received a PhD in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an A.B. in Economics from the University of California, Berkeley.  He is a Professor in the Graduate School of Management at the University of California, Davis. Prior to this, Marquez was an Associate Professor of Finance at the School of Management of Boston University, and was the Craig and Rhonda Cerny Associate Professor of Finance at Arizona State University. He has held various visiting positions at the FDIC and the U.S. Federal Reserve system

Marquez’s research focuses on the issue of competition among financial institutions and its implications for the allocation of credit.  Specifically, he is interested in analyzing how information problems for financial intermediaries interact with the way in which banks compete.  He has used this general framework to analyze issues of entry into banking markets, the acquisition of information about borrowers, the use of information technology, and changes in the structure of banking markets.  He has also done work studying regulation in banking when the economies in which the banks operate are financially integrated. More recently, Marquez’s work has focused on the design of financial contracts, and on theoretical issues within private equity markets and mergers and acquisitions.